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PREFACE 
The Chinese Students' Alliance plans to publish a series of 
pamphlets before the convocation of the Washington Con-
ference on various pertinent subjects bearing on China and 
the Washington Conference. The first of the series is an 
introduction to the general subject, China and the Washington 
Conference, written by T. L. Wang, prize-winner of the Wah 
Chang Trading Corporation Essay Contest. The second of 
the series is on the Shantung Question, written by M. Joshua 
Bau, which analyzes the problem from the point of view of 
history and international law. The subject is brought up to 
date, and includes the recent exchanges of communications 
between the Chinese and Japanese Governments regarding 
the terms of settlement. Pa~phlets on Tariff Automony and 
Extraterritoriality will soon be ready for publication and dis-
tribution. Another pamphlet entitled "Problems Involved in 
the Washington Conference," has been prepared by C. P. 
Cheng, which will soon appear in the series. Other pamph-
lets are in preparation ; and, as soon as ready, they will be 
distributed upon request. 
MINGCHIEN JoSHUA BAU. 
THE SHANTUNG QUESTION 
The Shantung Question has become a world problem. tike 
the Alsace-Lorraine controversy, which has just been settled 
by the World War, it carries the potential germ of another 
world conflict. As the facts of this question are well-known, 
we shall not attempt to reiterate them, but shall confine our 
t:ndeavors to an analysis of the problem with a view to reach-
ing a solution, just and equitable to China and Japan. 
To refresh the memory, we will recall that shortly after the 
outbreak of the World War, China declared her neutrality 
by a Presidential Mandate of August 6, 1914. On August 15, 
1914, Japan presented an ultimatum to Germany advising 
unconditional surrender of the leased territory on or before 
September 15, "with a view to eventual restoration of the 
same to China," and also advising the immediate withdrawal 
or disarmament of all belligerent vessels within Chinese and 
Japai\ese waters, asking for a reply by noon of August 23.1 
Failing to receive a reply at the appointed time, she declared 
war on Germany and proceeded to attack the German lease-
hold of Kiaochow. Meanwhile China did not protest against 
either the ultimatum or the attack, but on the contrary, inti-
mated her intention to participate in the campaign, which, 
however, was not received with favor. 
During the campaign, on September 3, 1914, Japan landed 
her troops at Lungkow, Shantung, outside the leased terri-
tory. On the same day, 01ina proclaimed a war zone de-
limiting the belligerent area to approximately one hundred 
miles west of Tsingtao, including Kiaochow and Laichow, but 
excluding Weihsien and Tsinan. On September 26, 1914, the 
Japanese troops, marching from Lungkow to Weihsien, cap-
tured the railway station there belonging to the Tsingtao-
Tsinan Railway, and on October 6, 1914, they seized the rail-
way station at Tsinan, the capital of Shantung. Soon they 
1. :'11illnrd, Our Eastern Question, p. 91. 
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took possession of the entire line of the Tsingtao-Tsinan 
Railway, displacing its employes and substituting Japanese 
subjects. In addition they also seized the German mines 
adjoining the railway. Meanwhile the siege of Tsingtao pro-
ceeded and on November 7, 1914, the stronghold was captured. 
Thereafter, on January 18, 1915, Japan presented the now 
celebrated Twenty-one Demands, among which was the pro-
vision (Group I, Article I) : 
"The Chinese Government engages to give full assent to 
all matters upon which the Japanese Government may here-
after agree with the German Government relating to the 
disposition of all rights, interests and concessions, which 
Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in 
relation to the province of Shantung." 2 
On May 7, 1915, Japan presented an ultimatum, because of 
which China yielded. In consequence, the treaties of May 25, 
1915, were signed, consisting of two treaties, one relating to 
Shantung with three exchanges of notes, and the other to 
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia with nine ex-
changes of notes. 
In return, Japan pledged to restore the leased territory of 
Kiaochow, in an exchange of notes, May 25, 1915: 
"When, after the termination of the present war, the 
leased territory of Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the 
free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will re-
store the said leased territory to China under the following 
conditions. 
"1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a com-
mercial seaport. 
"2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of 
Japan to be established at a place designated by the Japa-
nese Government. 
"3. If the foreign powers desire it, an international con-
cession may be established. 
'4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings 
and properties of Germany and the conditions and procedure 
2. 'J'he Chino-Japanese Negotiations, the Chinese Otl'irial State-
ment, 1015, p. •l!l. 
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relating thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese 
Government shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement 
before the restoration." a 
Then, on March 14, 1917, China severed diplomatic rela-
tions with Germany, and on Angust 14, 1917, declared war 
on Germany and Austria-Hungary, abrogating all the treaties, 
agreements, and conventions she had had with the Central 
Powers, to the effect that 
"All the treaties of whatever nature between China and 
Germany as well as Aust'ria-Hungary are abrogated, as also 
all such provisions of the Protocol of September 7, 1901, 
and other similar international agreements in so far as they 
concern China and Germany as well as Austria-Hungary." 4 
This was duly taken notice of by the legations addressed, 
including that of Japan. 
On September 24, 1918, in an exchange of notes between 
the Chinese Minister at Tokio and the Japanese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, respecting adjustment of questions con-
cerning Shantung, it was agreed that (Art. 6) "the Kiao-
chow-Chinan Railway, after its ownership is definitely de-
termined, is to be made a Chino-Japanese joint enter-
prise." 
At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, both China and 
Japan contended for the former German rights in Shantung. 
On April 30, 1919, the Council of Three rendered the decision 
in favor of J apan, which was incorporated in Articles 156, 
157, 158, of the Treaty of Peace with Germany, signed at 
Versailles on June 28, 1919. 
The question, as stated above, tW"ns on these issues : 
Whether Japan has the right 
( 1) To attack the leased territory of Kiaochow; 
3 Ibid, p. 53. 
4. 1\Iac:\!urra~·. Trestle and c\ greemenls with or Concerning 
Chin a, l!l17/ 7 . 
.5. Questions for Readjustment, submllted by China to the Paris 
Peace Conference, 19Hl, p. 82 . 
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(2) To land her troops at Lungkow and then march 
through Chinese territory; and 
(3) To seize the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway and the 
adjoining mines. 
2 Whether China's Declaration of War abrogates all treat-
ies, conventions and agreements with Germany and 
China thus recovers the German concessions in Shan-
tung. 
3 Whether Japan's possession of German rights in Shan-
tung is validated by 
( 1) The Treaty of May 25, 1915, and 
(2) The Agreement of September 24, 1918. 
As to whether Japan had the right to attack the leased 
territory of Kiaochow, there seems to be an honest difference 
of opinion. On the one hand, China claims that, inasmuch as 
she reserved her sovereignty over the leased territory in 
Article I of the Lease Convention,e she can assert the neu-
trality of the leased territory in time of a war in which the 
lessee state is involved. In other words, arising from the 
reservation of sovereignty, she deems the leased territory as 
neutral, and not subject to the hostile operation of bel-
ligerents. Further, even in case an attack shoud have become 
necessary to abate a nuisance or to remove a menace, she con-
tends that her previous consent should have been obtained 
before the attack could be legitimate. 
On the other hand, Japan claims that, basing her action on 
the precedent of Port Arthur and Talienwan, which leased 
territories she took from Russia in the war of 1904-5, the 
leased territories are not neutral , but are subject to hostile 
operations of the belligerents. The grant of the right of 
fortification, she contends, and the surrender of the right of 
administration, during the term of the lease, all indicate that 
these territories are proper objects of attack. She further 
6. Hertslet's China Treaties, Vol. J, No. G9, p. 351; Author's Chap-
ter on Leased Territories, The Foreign Relations o! China. 
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maintains that, granted she had no right to attack the terri-
tory, she had notified the Chinese Government before attack, 
and that the Chinese Government did not make any strenu-
ous objection, nor lodge any protest, but, on the contrary, 
requested participation in the attack, which, though rejected, 
could be taken as tantamount to tacit consent.7 
As to whether Japan had the right to land at Lungkow and 
march through the Chinese territory, it is quite safe to say 
that Japan had no such right, but, on the contrary, exceeded 
the limit of her rights and violated the neutrality of China. 
China having declared her neutrality by the Presidential 
Mandate of August 6, 1914,8 Japan was under obligation to 
respect her neutrality. She had no more right to move her 
troops and supplies through the neutral territory of China 
than Germany had in 1914 to cross the neutral territory of 
Belgium in order to attack France. "It is a principle of the 
law of nations that no belligerent can rightfully make use of 
the territory of a neutral state for belligerent purposes, with-
out the consent of the neutral Government." o 
It has been contended by Japan that military necessity 
justified the violation, inasmuch as she could attack Kiao-
chow more easily from the rear than from the front or the 
side. This argument, however, does not seem to stand the 
test of analysis. In the first place, there was no military ne-
cessity calling for such a violation of China's neutrality. 
Japan could have attacked Tsingtao by landing within the 
leased territory of Kiaochow, just as well as by way of Lung-
kow, if not better. This was witnessed by the action of the 
British, who, in due respect of China's neutrality, landed at 
Laoshan on September 23, and because of the shorter dis-
tance from Laoshan to Tsingtao, than from Lungkow to 
Tsingtao, and fewer neutral obstacles in the way, they reached 
7. '£he Shantun,~t Question, p. 40. 
8 :'.1ac'llurray, 1917/ 7. 
:J. Cushing, Att. Gen. 1853, 7 op. 367, cited In J. B. Moore, Vol. 7, 
p. 1089 
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the scene of action in time to participate in the first en-
counter with the Germans.10 This action on the part of the 
:British clearly proved that there was no such military neces-
sity, and this alone, in glaring contrast with Japan's action, 
is sufficient to establish the guilt of Japan. 
Granting for argument sake, that there was the military 
necessity, this still did not justify Japan's violation of China's 
neutrality. Germany pleaded the guilt of her own violation 
of Belgian neutrality on the ground of military necessity. 
But the world did not condone German's crime on that ac-
count. If the violation of Belgian neutrality is unjustifiable, 
as the verdict of mankind and the late World War have held 
it to be so, Japan's violation of China's neutrality by landing 
at Lungkow is equally unjustifiable, and, more so, because 
of the absence of any ground of military necessity. 
Perhaps it may be argued that China's proclamation of the 
war zone, on the same day of Japan's landing at Lungkow, 
fcllowing the precedent set in the Russo-Japanese War, 
seemed to have given her implied consent and hence justified 
Japan's action. It must be understood, however, that in pro-
c!.aiming the war zone, China did not mean to condone Japan's 
action, but rather aimed simply to protect herself from any 
consequences resulting from the actions of belligerents within 
her territory, so that she could be released from any charges 
of negligence as a neutral. In fact, under the difficult and 
embarrassing situation, the proclamation of a war zone was 
probably the only course of action to pursue. For China 
to resist Japan at Lungkow, in the face of force majeure, 
would have meant war, which would be contrary to the spirit 
of the law of neutrality. On the other hand, for China to re-
main silent would have been equally as inexpedient, since 
Germany could then have claimed damage for injuries due 
10. The Shantung Question, submitted ·bY China to the Paris 
Peace Conference, published by the Chinese National Weltare 
Society, March, 1920, p. 40. 
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to the negligence on the part of China to preserve her neu-
trality. Hence, confronted with a dilemma, China was con-
strained to proclaim the war zone, not to extenuate Japan 
but rather to protect her own position of neutrality. It is 
therefore plain that notwithstanding the proclamation of the 
war zone, Japan's landing at Lungkow remains a gross viola-
tion of China's neutrality. 
Respecting Japan's right to seize the Kiaochow-Chinan 
Railway, and the adjoining mines, it is again evident that 
Japan had no such right, but, on the contrary, she did so in 
violation of China's neutrality. The railway and mines in 
question were situated within Chinese territory outside the 
leased territory of Kiaochow, and hence they were under the 
protection of Chinese authorities. No matter whether they 
were the public or private property of Germans, the fact that 
they lay within the Chinese territory was sufficient to clothe 
them with the protection of China's neutrality and to exempt 
them from seizure by any belligerent whatsoever. 
In fact, Japan perpetrated the seizure in spite of the re-
peated protests of the Chinese Government and thus know-
ingly violated China's neutrality. As the war zone delimited 
belligerent activities to the east of Weihsien or within one 
hundred miles west of Tsingtao, and as, on September 26, the 
Japanese troops proceeded to W eihsien and occupied the rail-
way station, the Chinese Government protested on the next 
day, September 27, 1914: 
"On the 7th day of September a despatch received from 
your Government stated that your Government understood, 
with some difficulty, what our Government meant in that 
declaration. This Ministry (the Chinese Foreign Office) 
further declared that the railroad from Weihsien to Chinan 
should be under Chinese protection, and through Your Ex-
cellency we requested your Government to issue an order 
prohibiting your troops from advancing to W eihsien, or any 
place west of Weihsien. But now the troops of your Gov-
ernment have forced their way into W eihsien and taken 
possession of the railway. Considering that the railway 
II 
belongs to a Sino-German corporation, that all the railway 
stations have also been under Chinese protection, and in 
none of them has there ever been any German troops, and 
that Weihsien is in the purely neutral territory; the acts 
committed by the troops of your country are manifestly 
contrary to the declaration and in violation of China's 
neutrality." 12 
Following this protest, on the next day, September 28, 1914, 
the Japanese Minister at Peking called at the Chinese Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, and, to the surprise and indigna-
tion of the Chinese Government, informed the latter that, 
because of military necessity, the Japanese troops would 
move westward from W eihsien and occupy the whole line. 
In consequence of this, on September 30, 1914, the Chinese 
Government again protested : 
"It is a settled principle that even the public property of 
a belligerent, while on a neutral territory, can not be attack-
ed, or taken possession of by the other belligerent, much 
more so in the present case when the property in question is 
jointly owned by Chinese and German capitalists. . . . It 
has been a long while since the troops of your country have 
begun to attack Tsingtao, and the German troops in Tsing-
tao have been isolated, rendered helpless, and entirely and 
long ago cut off from the communication through the Kiao-
chow Railway. Not only our Government will never allow 
the Germans to make use of the line ; it is actually beyond 
their power to make use of it. Therefore the contemplated 
action of your country is decidedly not a case of military 
necessity"ts 
In response to these repeated protests, the Japanese Gov-
ernment replied on October 2, 1914, that the German Kiao-
chow-Chinan Railway was of the same nature and character 
as the leased territory and that the purpose of Japan's attack 
was not only to eliminate the German base of Kiaochow, but 
to gain the control and administration of the railway in ques-
12. Note from the \\f!ni stry of Forei gn Atl'airs to the Japanese 
Minister a t P eking protesting against violation of neutra lity, 
Sept. 27, 1014, 'l'he Shantung Question, op. cit., p. 58. 
l."l. Ministry Clf F oreign ~~fl'alrs to Japanese Minis ter at P eking. 
Sept. 30, 1914, The Shantung Question , op. cit., p. 59. 
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tion. Reiterating the argument of military necessity, it con-
tended that, lying at the rear of the leased territory, the con-
trol of the railway was essential to the safety of Japan in 
Kiaochow: 
"Regarding the Shantung Railway, . . . it is of the same 
character as the leased territory. This fact is beyond dis-
pute, in view of its origin, the special charter given by the 
German Government and the way in which the company 
draws its funds. . . . 
"Moreover, a railway from its very nature positively can 
not be treated one part separately from the other. Al-
though one part of this German-owned railway is situated 
west of Weihsien, it can not be held as having changed its 
character on the ground that a part remains in neutral terri-
tory. Besides, the aim of the Imperial Government is not 
only to overthrow the base possessed by the enemy, but also 
to cause the control and administration of this indivisible 
railway to fall into our possession. 
• • • 
"Although the Chin~se Government holds that under the 
present condition the Shantung Railway can not be utilized 
by the German troops in view of its severance with China, 
yet from the attacking troops' point of view, the railway 
being immediately behind Tsingtao, and in view of the pres-
ent situation, it is a serious danger to the military operation 
to leave a railway by the enemy perfectly free."14 
It can be seen, from these extracts of the official corre-
spondence, that what China strove for was the preservation of 
her neutrality, and that what Japan aimed at was not only 
the leased territory of Kiaochow, but also the Kiaochow-
Chinan Railway with the adjoining mines, though lying within 
Chinese neutral territory. Such facts can not but compel a 
reasonable and impartial mind to declare that Japan, in gain-
ing control of the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway and the adjoining 
mines, evidently violated the neutrality of China. 
14. Japanese Minister at Peking to the Chinese llllnlstry of For-
eig-n Afl'alrs, Oct. 2, 1914, The Shantung Qu<!stlon, Ibid .. PP-
159-60. 
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This conclusion is all the more convincing and inescapable, 
when the rules governing the inviolability of neutral terri-
tory as summarized by John Bassett Moore are taken into 
consideration: 16 
" . . . It appears ( 1) that the commission of hostility 
against another on neutral territory is a violation of the law 
of nations ; (2) that such violation involves an offense to 
the neutral nation, and that reparation from the offending 
belligerent is due to that nation alone; (3) that, if property 
was captured, it is the duty of the offending belligerent to 
restore it on the demand of the neutral; ( 4) that nations. 
have, by numerous treaties, pledged themselves as neutrals 
and to use 'all the means in their power' to protect or effect 
the restitution of property in such cases ; but ( 5) that the 
manner in which this obligation must be discharged was 
not ascertained by any express rule or by any general un-
derstanding." 
Applying these rules to Japan's seizure of the German 
Kiaochow-Chinan Railway and the adjoining mines lying 
within the Chinese neutral territory outside the leased area, 
it is clear that she violated China's neutrality and that in con-
sequence she is under obligation, upon the demand of China, 
to restore the same. " 
Vve next come to the issue whether China's declaration of 
war abrogates all the treaties of whatever nature, thus legal-
izing China's recovery of Germany's former concessions in 
Shantung. The writers on international law are not agreed 
as to whether war abrogates all treaties which pre-suppose 
the continuance of peace, except those made in anticipation 
of rupture.16 Like Vattel, Kent contends that "as a general 
rule, the obligations of treaties are dissipated by hostility, 
and they are extinguished and gone forever, unless revived 
by a subsequent treaty. But if a treaty contain any stipula-
tions which contemplate a state of future war, and make 
15. J". B. Moore, Internntlonnl Lnw Digest, Vol. 7, p. 1101. 
16. Ibid, Vol. 5, p. 384. 
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provisions for such an exigency, they preserve their force 
and obligation when the rupture takes place." 1 7 On the other 
hand, Fiore says: "The extinction of all treaties and con-
ventions concluded between the belligerent states can not 
be deemed au immediate effect of war, but only the termina-
tion of those which, by their nature and object, are necessarily 
inconsistent with a state of war." 1s 
Another reasonable doctrine is that of Calvo, which 
states :19 "The sol1.1tion of these questions depends naturally 
upon the particular character of the engagements contracted. 
Thus all are agreed in admitting the rupture of conventional 
ties concluded expressly with a view to a state of peace, of 
which special object is to promote relations of harmony be-
tween nation and nation, such as treaties of amity, of alli-
ance, and other acts of the same nature having a political 
character. As to customs and postal arrangements, conven-
tions of navigation and commerce, and agreements relative to 
private interests, they are generally considered as suspended 
till the cessation of hostilities. By necessary consequence, it 
is a principle that every stipulation written with reference to 
war, as well as all clauses described as perpetual, (qttali-
fices de perpetuelles) preserve in spite of the outbreak of 
hostilities their obligatory force so long as the belligerents 
have not, by common accord, annulled them or replaced them 
with others." 
John Bassett Moore presented his own conclusion on the 
subject as follows: "It is evident that ... there was a re-
cognition of the principle, which is now received as funda-
mental, that the question whether the stipulations of a treaty 
are annulled by war depends upon their intrinsic character. 
17. K ent, Comm. I , 176, cited In J. B. Moore, Vol. 5, p . 385n. 
18. Fiore's Internntl. Law Codified, translated by E. M. Bor-
chard, p. 538. 
l!l. Calvo, Droit Int. (4th Ed.) IV, 65, sec. 1031, cited in J. B. 
Moore, Vol. 5, p. 385. 
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H they relate to a right which the outbreak of war does not 
annul, the treaty itself remains unannulled." 2o 
Taking as our criterion the conclusion of Moore that the 
question as to whether the stipulations of a treaty are an-
nullel by war depends upon their intrinsic character, it is evi-
dent that the treaties in question are of an intrinsic character 
which the war should nullify. The German lease convention 
of March 6, 1898, was extorted from China by the threat 
of the mailed fist. It further alienated from China her 
jurisdiction over the leased territory for ninety-nine years. 
In the event of war, the continuance of an alien jurisdiction 
on the soil of China would be inimical to her safety, and it 
is but natural, therefore, that she should avail herself of the 
opportunity of war to remove that source of danger and 
recovers the delegates, or rather wrested, rights of sovereignty. 
Further, the lease convention granted to Germany the right 
of fortification, which meant that Germany, in time of war, 
could use the leased territory as a basis of action against 
China. It is but plain, therefore, that such a treaty should 
not be allowed to persist in time of war, but should be abro-
gated upon the declaration of the same. As to the Tsingtao-
Chinan Railway and the adjoining mines, while the agree-
ments thereon were not intrinsically of a character as not 
incompatible with the status of war, their public character 
and their strategic and political relations to the safety of 
China warranted their being taken into custody by the terri-
torial sovereign during the period of war, and pending the 
final settlement at the peace negotiation. 
It can, therefore, be fairly concluded that, inasmuch as the 
declaration of war on the part of China had abrogated the 
lease convention of March 6, 1898, all the German rights in 
Shantung arising therefrom should have reverted to China 
20 . .T . B. :\foore, Columbia Law Review, Apr. 1901, Vol. 1, No. 
4, pp. 200-223, pp. 217-8, .T. B . Moore, Int'natl. Lnw Dla-., 
Vol. 5, p. 383. 
16 
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automatically, and that Japan's possession of them from that 
moment on was in defiance and contravention of China's 
rights. It can also be affirmed that the Kiaochow-Tsingtao 
Railway and the adjoining mines should have come Into the 
custody and possession of China upon her declaration of war, 
and that Japan's control and possession of the same was not 
only consummated in violation of China's neutrality, but also 
retained in defiance and contravention of China's rights. 
We now come to the third issue whether Japan's possession 
of the German rights in Shantung is validated by the Treaty 
pf May 25, 1915, and the Agreement of September 24, 1918. 
As regards the consent which Japan exacted from China by 
virtue of Article I of the Treaty of May 25, 1915, respecting 
Sbantung,21 it must be observed that the assent, as provided 
therein, conceding for argument sake its validity, which is 
contested, is not applicable to the final settlement at the Paris 
Peace Conference. For the negotioation was not between 
Germany and Japan as stipulated in the provision, but be-
tween the Allied and associated Powers on the one hand and 
Germany on the other. Hence, inasmuch as Japan was "de-
barred from negotiating separately with Germany in respect 
to the latter's system in Shantung owing to the decision of 
the Conference to deal with German territories and conces-
sions without consulting Germany," it is evident that Japan 
did not comply with the provision of coming to an agreement 
with Germany regarding the free disposal of Kiaochow and 
that "the article in question should be deemed inoperativve." 22 
Granting, however, for argument's sake, that the settlement 
as reached at the Paris Peace Conference came within the 
scope of the provision, it is to be claimed that the consent 
was not given of China's free will, but rather was exacted 
under the duress of the ultimatum of May 7, 1915, and the 
21. The Chino-Japanese Ne;;otiatlons, op. cit. p. 40, Art. 1. 
'l'reuty ot 1915 respecting Shantung. 
22. The Shantung Question, pp. 17-18. 
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demonstration of naval and military forces accompanying it. 
While international law recognizes the validity of treaties 
:mposed, even under coercion, by the victorious states upon 
the vanquished, it is, nevertheless, not within reason to be-
lieve that international law recognizes the validity of treaties 
imposed by one friendly nation upon another, while in the 
relation of peace and amity. It is true that "coercion, while 
invalidating a contract produced by it, does not invalidate a 
treaty so produced. Thus there can be no question of the 
binding force of the treaty which followed the French-
German War which led to the dethronement of Napoleon III, 
though its terms were assented to under coercion. The same 
may be said of the consent of France in the settlement en-
forced by the allies after Waterloo, and so of the treaty by 
which Mexico ceded California and the adjacent territory 
to the United States." 23 It is, nevertheless, to be noted that 
what is recognized by international law is the validity of 
treaties made in consequence of war though imposed neces-
sarily by the victor on the vanquished under duress, and that 
it is not conceivable that international law, postulating as it 
does the fundamental principles of territorial sovereignty and 
the equality and independence of states, will countenance 
and give validity to an agreement or treaty, the consent to 
which was exacted from a friendly nation in time of peace, 
and this in consequence of the violation of the latter's neu-
trality. Fiore says, while admitting the validity of treaties 
imposed by victorious states upon defeated in consequence 
of war, •'treaties concluded between states must be freely 
assented to. Assent is not valid if given by mistake, ex-
torted by violence or obtained by fraud." 24 
The official statement given out by the Chinese Government 
regarding the Chino-Japanese negotiations of 1915 clearly 
proves that China's consent relating to the disposal of the 
23. J". B. Moore, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 183. 
24. Flore's lnt'natl. Law Cocllficd, op . cit, p. 332. 
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German rights in Shantung was not freely and fully given, 
but was exacted under the duress of the ultimatum of May 7, 
1915. The statement records that on February 2, 1915, at the 
first conference, while she consented in principle to Article 1 
relating to the disposal of the German rights in Shantung, 
China nevertheless made certain counter-proposals as condi-
tions to the grant of her consent, namely, Japan's pledge to 
restore Kiaochow, China's right to be represented at the 
negotiations between Japan and Germany when dealing with 
the disposal of Kiaochow, the indemnification of Chinars 
losses due to Japan's operations within the Chinese terri-
tory, the restoration of the control of the Maritime Customs, 
the telegraph and the post-offices in the possession of Japan, 
the removal of the Japanese military railway and telegraph 
lines and the withdrawal of Japanese troops.25 
Again, China's reply of May 1, 1915, to Japan's revised 
demands of April 26, 1915, while giving her cgnsent to any 
settlement that Japan might reach with Germany at the con-
clusion of the war, the Chinese Government specifically in-
serted two provisions calculated to preserve the sovereignty 
of China in Shantung and the leased territory and to act as 
conditions to the grant of the consent in question: 25• 
"The Japanese Government declares that when the 
Chinese Government give their assent to the disposition of 
interests above referred to, Japan will restore the leased 
territory of Kiaochow to China; and further recognize the 
right of the Chinese Government to participate in the ne-
gotiations referred to above between Japan and Germany. 
"The Japanese Government consent to be responsible for 
the indemnification of all losses occasioned by Japan's mili-
tary operation around the leased territory of Kiaochow. 
The customs, telegraphs and postoffices within the leased 
territory of Kiaochow shall, prior to the restoration of the 
said leased territory to China, be administered as hereto-
fore for the time being. The railways and telegraph lines 
25. The Chino-Japanese Negotiations, op. cit., p.4-5. 
25a Ibid, p. 35. 
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erected by Japan for military purposes are to be removed 
forthwith. The Japanese troops now stationed outside 
the original leased territory of Kiaochow are now to be 
withdrawn first, those within the original leased territory 
are to be withdrawn on the restoration of the said leased 
territory to China." 
Japan's ultimatum of May 7, 1915, contains a reference 
to these conditions as set forth by China which proves 
beyond doubt that, except for the duress or coercion of the 
ultimatum, China would not have consented to Japan's set-
tlement with Germany regarding the disposal of the German 
rights in Shantung at the conclusion of the war, and that 
it was the duress exerted by the ultimatum that caused the 
Chinese Government to relinquish the proposed conditions 
and to accept Japan's formula for the consent without any 
qualification. The ultimatum ran in part as follows ;26 
"Furthermore, the Chinese Government not only ignored 
the friendly feelings of the Imperial Government in offering 
the restoration of Kiaochow Bay, but also in replying to 
the revised proposals they even demanded its uncondi-
tional restoration ; and again China demanded that Japan 
should bear the responsibility of paying indemnity for all 
the unavoidable losses and damages resulting from Japan's 
military operations at Kiaochow; and still further in con-
nection with the territory of Kiaochow China advanced 
other demands and declared that she has the right of par-
ticipation at the future Peace Conference to be held be-
tween Japan and Germany. Although China is fully aware 
that the unconditional restoration of Kiaochow and Japan's 
responsibility of indemnification for the unaovidable losses 
and damages can never be tolerated by Japan, yet she pur-
posely advanced these demands and declared that their reply 
was final and decisive." 
It can therefore be safely said that, except for the duress 
of the ultimatum with the accompanying demonstration of 
force,2' China would not have given up these conditions and 
26. Ibid pp . 40·41. 
27. Hearings before the Committee on For. Rei., U. S. Sen., 66 
Cong. let Ses. Sen. Document No . 106 on Treaty or Peace 
w lth Germany signed at Versallles on June 28, 1919, pp. 561 
to 562, testimony or Mr. Ferguson. 
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that it was the coercion-and coercion applied to a friendly 
nation while in the relations of peace and amity,-that ex-
torted the consent. It is also obviously in accordance with 
the spirit of international law to maintain that such a consent 
obtained under duress or coercion should invalidate Japan's 
possession of the former German rights in Shantung. 
Adverting to whether the agreement of September 24, 
1918, validates Japan's control over the Kiaochow-Chinan 
Railway, Article 6 of which provides: 
"The Kiaochow-Chinan Railway, after its ownership is 
definitely determined, is to be made a Chino-Japanese joint 
enterprise," 
and Article 4 of which stipulates: 
"Japanese are to be employed at the headquarters of the 
above mentioned police force at the principal railway sta-
tions and at the police training school," 2s 
the opinion must be expressed that in view of the illegal 
consideration for which the agreement was made, the agree-
ment in question can not forestall China's claims to her own 
rights and validate Japan's possession of the German rights in 
Shantung. While it is true that "a consideration is essential 
to give effect to a contract, but it is possible to conceive of a 
treaty which has no consideration,"29 it is, nevertheless, rea-
sonable to believe that international law, upholding as it does 
the fundamental principle of territorial sovereignty, will not 
be prone to countenance the validity of a treaty, which was 
exacted on the basis of an illegal consideration arising out 
of the violation of the fundamental principle of territorial 
sovereignty. For the Agreement of September 24, 1918, was 
concluded on the part of China to induce the withdrawal of 
Japan's civil administration established in Shantung in viola-
tion of China's sovereignty. It is an accepted principle that 
civil administration proceeds out of, and usually follows, mili-
28. The Shantung Question, pp. 67-68. 
29. J. B. Moore, op. cit., Vol. 5, p. 183. 
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tary occupation, but, in this particular case, the military occu-
pation was accomplished in violation of China's neutrality 
and sovereignty as shown above, and hence the civil admin-
istration proceeding out of, and following, an illegal military 
occupation can not but be illegitimate. 
The official Chinese claims at the Paris Peace Conference 
recorded: 
"Under an imperial ordinance No. 175 of October 1, 1917, 
the Japanese Government established a Civil Administration 
at Tsingtao with branches at Fantze, Chantien, and Chinan, 
and of which three cities are situated along the railway 
outside of the leased territory, and of the fifty kilometre 
zone. . . . The Fantze branch of the Japanese Civil 
Administration has even asserted jurisdiction in lawsuits 
between Chinese and has levied taxes on them. . . .Hso 
It was because of this illegal establishment of civil admin-
istration in consequence of a military occupation done in 
violation of China's neutrality and sovereignty, and the con-
sequent indignation of the Chinese, especially the Shantung 
people, that the Chinese Government was constrained to agree 
with Japan for the Chino-Japanese joint administration of 
the Kiaochow Railway and the Japanese supervision of the 
railway police thereof in exchange for the withdrawal of 
Japan's civil administration.s1 ,S 2 Hence, inasmuch as the 
consideration for which the agreement was made was illegal 
and in fact in direct violation of China's territorial sov-
ereignty, the agreement of September Z4, 1918, can not vali-
date Japan's control over the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway. Or 
else Japan's violation of China's neutrality and sovereignty, 
instead of being discouraged by proper penalties, would be 
encouraged and condoned by substantial rewards which is 
contrary to the spirit of international law.ss 
30. The Shantung Question, p. 42. 
31. Ibid, p. 42. 
32. Cf. Statements by the Chinese Pence Delegation, May S, 1919, 
Millard's Review Supp. July 17, 1920, p . 10. 
33. Hearings, op. cit., pp. 444-5, Mr. T. F. Millard's testimony. 
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It may be argued that, in connection with the agreement, 
on the same date, an advance of twenty million yen was 
made for the construction of the Chinan-Shunteh and Kaomi-
Hsuchow Railways and that another advance of a similar 
amount was made for the construction of four railways in 
Manchuria and Mongolia; hence China was estopped from 
making any objection to the agreement of September 24, 1918, 
respecting the Kiachow-Chinan Railway. It is true that on 
the same date two other separate and independent agree-
ments were signed for the construction of the above-men-
tioned railways, and it is also true that the Chinese Govern-
ment received a total advance of forty million yen. As far 
as the two agreements are concerned regarding the construc-
tion of the railways in question, they may stand valid. It Is, 
nevertheless, to be noted that the agreement of September 
24, 1918, respecting the control of the Kiaochow Railway, 
was entirely separate and independent from the other two, 
and was made not in consideration of the two advances of 
twenty million yen each, nor for the consideration of Japan's 
construction of the two railways in Shantung and the four 
railways in Manchuria and Mongolia, buf rather in consid-
eration of the withdrawal of Japan's civil administration and 
Japanese troops along the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway (except 
a contingent at Chinan), which, as we have seen, was illegal. 
The only fact in common between this illegal agreement 
and the other agreements for which the two advances 
had been received was that they were concluded and signed 
on the same day of September 24, 1918. Beyond this, there 
was no relation between these agreements.a4 Hence, inas-
much as the two advances of twenty million yen each were 
made in connection with the other agreements, that of Sep-
tember 24, 1918, respecting the control of the Kiaochow-
Chinan Railway, still remains invalid and therefore does not 
34. For the text of the agreement, see The Shantung Question, 
op. cit., pp . 66-70. 
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confer upon Japan any title or right of possession and control 
with respect to the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway. 
Summarizing the conclusions we have so far reached re-
lating to the issues of the Shantung question, it can be said 
that, while admitting the ground for an honest difference of 
opinion relative to her right to attack Kiaochow, Japan had 
nc right to land her troops at Lungkow and march through 
Chinese neutral territory and seize the German Kiaochow-
Chinan Railway and the adjoining mines, in violation of 
China's neutrality and sovereignty; that China's declaration 
of war did abrogate the lease convention of March 6, 1898, 
and thus automatically regained the former German conces-
sions arising out of the convention and entitled her to the 
custody and possession of the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway and 
the adjoining mines, pending the final settlement at the Peace 
negotiation ; and that Japan's possession of the German rights 
in Shantung was not validated by the consent relative to Ja-
pan's settlement with Germany as to the disposal of the German 
rights in Shantung as embodied in Article I of the Treaty 
of May 25, 1915, respecting the Province of Shantung, which 
consent, as we have seen, was extorted under the duress of 
an ultimatum ; nor was it justified by the Agreement of Sep-
tember 24, 1918, respecting adjustment of questions concern-
ing Shantung, which, as we recall, was contracted for an 
illegal consideration, that is, the withdrawal of Japanese 
troops from the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway and of the Japa-
nese civil administration from Shantung, both of which were 
illegally established. In view of these conclusions, we can 
not but be constrained to reach the conclusion that Japan 
has held the leased territory of Kiaochow as against the rights 
of China since China's declaration of war on August 24, 1917, 
and that she has acquired the German rights in the Kiaochow-
Chinan Railway and the adjoining mines in violation of 
China's neutrality and sovereignty and in defiance of her 
repeated protests. Hence, Japan is under legal and moral 
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obligation to return to China the leased territory of Kiao-
chow and to place in the custody and possession of the 
Chinese G~v~r~1men~ the German Kiaochow-Chinan Railway 
and the ad)ommg mmes, subject possibly to proper compensa-
tion for Japan's service in the capture of the leased territory. 
In view of these conclusions, we affirm that the Shantung 
decision as rendered at the Paris Peace Conference by the 
Council of Three on April 30, 1919, was unjust. The Council 
awarded Japan all the German rights in Shantung, and, in 
addition, the right to officer the railway police along the 
Kiaochow-Chinan Railway, and to establish a permanent con-
cession in Tsingtao. 
Articles 156, 157, 158, of the Treaty of Peace with Ger-
many, embodying this decision, read: 
"Germany renounces, in favor of Japan, all her rights, 
titles and privileges-particularly those concerning the terri-
tory of Kiaochow, railways, mines and submarine cables-
which she acquired in virtue of the treaty concluded by her 
with China on March 6, 1898, and of all other arrange-
ments relative to the Province of Shantung. 
"All German rights in the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu Railway, 
including its branch lines together with its subsidiary prop-
erty of all kinds, stations, shops, fixed and rolling stock, 
mines, plant and material for the exploitation of the mines, 
are and remain acquired by Japan, together with all rights 
and privileges, attaching thereto. 
"The German state submarine cables from Tsingtao to 
Shanghai and from Tsingtao to Chefoo, with all the rights, 
privileges and properties attaching thereto, are similarly 
acquired by Japan free and clear of all charges and encum-
brances. (Art. 156.) 
"The movable and immovable property owned by the 
German state in the territory of Kiaochow, as well as all 
the rights which Germany might claim in consequen.ce of 
the works or improvements made or of the expenses mcur-
red by her, directly or indirectly, in connection with this 
territory, are and remain acquired by Japan, free and clear 
of all charges and encumbrances. (Art. 157.) 
"Germany shall hand over to Japan within three months 
from the coming into force of the present treaty the 
archives, registers, plans, title deeds and documents of 
every kind, wherever they may be, relating to the adminis-
tration, whether civil, military, financial, judicial or other, 
of the territory of Kiaochow. 
"Within the same period Germany shall gtve particulars to 
Japan of all treaties, arrangements or agreements relating 
to the rights, title or privileges referred to in the two 
preceding articles." (Art. 168.) 
It will be seen that the rights conferred upon Japan were 
not those belonging to Germany, but those legitimately belong-
ing to China, as we hold that the German rights had automa-
tically reverted to China upon the declaration of war on August 
14, 1917. 8 ~ Hence, the Council of Three has awarded to 
Japan the rights, not of Germany, but of China,-not of an 
enemy, but of an ally or associate in the war. As the Chinese 
Peace Delegation at Paris put it: "It appears clear that the 
Council has been bestowing to Japan rights, not of Germany, 
but of China, not of the enemy but of an ally. A more 
powerful ally has reaped benefits at the expense, not of the 
common enemy, but of a weaker ally." sa 
What is worse, the Council of Three has awarded these 
legitimate rights of China, to Japan-a state that has per-
petrated the crime of the violation of China's neutrality and 
sovereignty. Instead of requiring the offending state to re-
store the former German rights to the rightful sovereign 
owner, which should be the dictates of reason and con-
science, the Council condoned and encouraged Japan's conduct 
by awarding her the German rights in Shantung. The incon-
sistency is all the more glaring, when it is seen that, in the 
ca5e of Germany, her violation of Belgian neutrality was so 
severely condemned and penalized, but in the case of Japan, 
for her violation of China's neutrality, especially in view of 
35. This declaration was oll'icially presented to, and taken cogni-
zance or, by the Allied and Associated Governments-the 
statement by the Chinese Peace Delegation, .May 3, 1919, Mil-
lard's Review, Supp., July 17, 1920, p. 19. 
86. Statement by the Chinese Peace Delegation. Ibid. 
the absence of any ground of military necessity, she was not 
only penalized, but on the contrary, awarded the rights, not 
of Germany, but of China,-a friendly ally and loyal asso-
ciate in the war.s7 
It may, however, be contended, that, unjust as the Shan-
tung decision might be, the Allied Powers were bound by the 
secret agreements of February and March, 1917, to award 
the German rights in Shantung to Japan.as It must, never-
theless, be observed that these secret agreements were made 
prior to the acceptance of Wilson's peace terms as set 
forth in his address to the United States Congress on June 
8, 1918, and in his subsequent speeches, and hence, were ab-
rogated by the subsequent acceptance of Wilson's principles 
of peace. To this effect the testimony was put on record 
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: 
". . . On looking over the addresses of President Wil-
son and the statement made by Secretary Lansing to the 
German Government with regard to the bases of peace, I 
found this (reading) : 
" 'The unqualified acceptance by the present German 
Government and by a large majority of the German 
Reichstag of the terms laid down by the President of 
the United States of America in his address to the Con-
gress of the United States on the 8th of January, 1918, 
and in his subsequent addresses, justifies the President 
in making a frank and direct statement of his decision 
with regard to the communications of the German Gov-
ernment of the 8th and 12th of October, 1918.' 
"Now as to the subsequent addresses, although there is 
nothing directly bearing upon the question of the 14 points 
mentioned in the address of January 18, one of the subse-
quent addresses was that on the 4th of July at Washington's 
Tomb at Mount Vernon in which he said: 
37. It should be further observed that inasmuch as the Klao-
chow lease convention stipulated that Germany should en-
gage not to sublet the leasehold to any other state, the 
Shantung decision violated the sanctity ot this treaty obli-
gation. 
38. For the secret agreements, see Mlllnrd'a Review supp. Jul;v 
17, 1920, pp. 1-3. 
"'No half-way decision is conceivable. These are the 
ends for which the associated peoples of the world are 
fighting and which must be conceded them before there 
can be peace.' 
"Then he mentions, one, 'the destruction of any arbi-
trary power anywhere, and so on, and two is the one to 
which I want to call attention. (Reading:) 
" 'The settlement of every question, whether of territory, 
of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political 
relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that 
settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not 
upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of 
any other nation or people which may desire a different 
settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or 
mastery.' 
"I think it was in this memorandum to the President that 
I mentioned this point. I can not say positively that it 
was in that or some other connection that I called attention 
to this statement and said that my understanding was that 
all the powers who entered into the agreement for the 
negotiation of peace after the armistice of November 11 
practically accepted the bases of peace as laid down by the 
American Government and that this was one of the bases 
of peace, and that no exception, no reservation, had been 
made to this by any of the powers, by Great Britain, 
France, or Japan, although Great Britain did make reser-
vations with regard to some other things, and that there-
fore it seemed to me that any prior arrangement such as 
these secret treaties between Great Britain and Japan and 
between France and Japan ought not to be held any longer 
in force because they were really abrogated by the accept-
ance of these bases of peace."ao 
It may be further contended that the Shantung decision in 
favor of Japan was necessary to prevent Japan's leaving 
the Paris Peace Conference and thus to save the League of 
Nations just on the eve of formation. In fact, that was the 
opinion of Wilson, and probably the real reason for his de-
cision.•0 It must, however, be considered that the fear of 
39. Hearings, op. cit., pp. 622 to 623, the testi-mony o! Professor 
FJ. T. Williams. 
40. Ct. Hearings, Conference at White House, Aug. 19, 1919, pp. 
531-2. 
Japan's withdrawal from the Conference or refusal to sign 
the Treaty was not well founded. It is unlikely that Japan 
would exclude herself from the League for the loss of the 
former German rights in Shantung. Secretary Lansing testi-
fied before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations that 
he believed Japan would have signed the Treaty even though 
the decision should have been against her, the main considera-
tion being membership in the League : 41 
"Senator Johnson of California: Would the Japanese 
signatures to the League of Nations have been obtained if 
you had not made the Shantung agreement? 
"Secretary Lansing: I think so. 
"Senator Johnson of California: You do? 
"Secretary Lansing: I think so. 
"Senator Johnson of California: So that even though 
Shantung had not been delivered to Japan, the League of 
Nations would not have been injured? 
"Secretary Lansing: I do not think so. 
"Senator Johnson of California: And you would have 
had the same signatories that you have now? 
"Secretary Lansing: Yes; one more, China. 
"Senator Johnson of California: One more, China. So 
that the result of the Shantung decision was simply to lose 
China's signature rather than to gain Japan's? 
"Secretary Lansing: That is my personal view, but I may 
be wrong about it." 
Granted for argument's sake that there was real danger 
of Japan's leaving the Conference or refusing to become a 
member of the League, it is manifest that the decision was 
rendered on the ground of expediency rather than that of 
intrinsic justice. While it is admitted that expediency, when 
not involving questions of morality, may become a guiding 
principle of statesmanship, it must be maintained, neverthe-
less, that when moral issues are involved, expediency must 
be subordinated to morality. In other words, in life as well 
as in statesmanship, morality must reign supreme, notwith-
standing considerations of expediency. 
H. Hearings, Senate Doc., No. 106, op. cit., p. 182. 
Passing from the injustice of the Shantung decision, we 
now come to consider Japan's policy in relation to Shantung. 
In the statement of Wilson, August 6, 1919,42 the policy of 
Japan relative to Shantung was said to be as follows : 
"The policy of Japan is to hand back the Shantung 
Peninsula in fu11 sovereignty to China, retaining only the 
economic privileges granted to Germany, and the right to 
establiSh a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsintao. 
"The owners of the railway will use special police only 
to insure security for traffic. They will be used for no 
other purpose. 
"The police force will be composed of Chinese, and such 
Japanese instructors as the directors of the railway may 
select will be appointed by the Chinese Government." 
Taking this as the policy of Japan, it will be noticed that 
Japan presumed to have in her possession the sovereignty of 
Shantung which she had in no way acquired, and which was 
expressly reserved in the lease convention of March 6, 1898. 
Whatever sovereignty is now in her possession must have 
been acquired in violation of China's neutrality and sove-
reignty. And yet 'Japan pledges to return Shantung to Chin& 
in fu11 sovereignty. That is, Japan proposes to return some-
thing to China which by right is not hers but China's. 
Probably what she meant by the sovereignty of Shantung 
is the leased territory of Kiaochow, which she proposed to 
return, and, in fact, pledged to do so. If so, then, as we 
have seen, inasmuch as China's declaration of war, on August 
14, 1917, abrogated the lease convention of March 6, 1898, 
and hence recovered to herself the rights of the leased terri-
tory, Japan is proposing to return something to China which 
by right belongs to China and which Japan has held, ever 
~ince the day of China's declaration of war, in contravention 
of the sovereign rights of China. 
It wi11 be further noticed that the second part of Japan's 
42. N. ¥. Tlmes, Aug. 7, 1919; Millard's Review, Supp, J"uly 17, 
1920, P. 16; also see Cbas. B. llllliott, The Shantung Question, 
Amerlcan J"ournal of Internatl. Law, Vol. 13, 1919, pp. 728. 
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policy is to retain all German economic concessions in Shan-
tung, including the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway and the ad-
JOmmg mines. It is needless to point out again that these 
economic concessions have been seized and retained by Japan 
in violation of China's neutrality and in defiance of China's 
repeated protests, and that since China's declaration of war 
they should have been in the custody and possession of 
China, pending final settlement with Germany at the Peace 
negotiation, and that Japan is under moral and legal obliga-
tions to restore the same to China. And yet Japan proposes 
to retain these ill-gotten concessions. 
Again, Japan plans to establish a railway police along the 
Kiaochow-Chinan Railway officered by the Japanese though 
manned by the Chinese, basing her right to do so on the 
Agreement of September 24, 1918, respecting adjustment of 
questions concerning Shantung. As has been already shown, 
the agreement in question is void or voidable, because of its 
illegal consideration. Besides, the right of police is in excess 
of the former German rights in Shantung. In the agreement 
of March 21, 1900, respecting the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway 
regulations,43 it was specifically stipulated (Art. 16) : 
"If troops are needed, outside of the hundred 1i (50 kilo-
metres) zone, they shall be despatched by the Governor of 
the Province of Shantung. No foreign troops may be em-
ployed for this purpose." 
In the subsequent convention of November 28, 1905,*' Ger-
many engaged to withdraw her troops from Kiaochow and 
Kaomi to Tsingtao (Arts. 1 and 2) ; and to leave the neutral 
zone and railway to the police of the Chinese Government. 
Hence, in view of the limitations of the German rights in 
Shantung, Japan's claim to establish railway police along 
the Kiaochow-Chinan Railway is in excess of the German 
rights and in violation of China's sovereignty. 
43. The Shantung Question. pp. 50·54 . 
44. Ibid pp. 54·56. 
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The political significance of the Shantung question can not 
be overestimated. This question represents the historic issue 
of the struggle between the Chinese nation and the foreign 
powers, the issue of territorial sovereignty. Ever since her 
opening, China was confronted with the greatest problem 
of all her history-that is, how to preserve her territorial 
integrity and political independence in the face of foreign 
aggression. She attempted to solve this great problem by. 
the Boxer Uprising in 1900, which only plunged her into the 
depths of humiliation. Failing in this, she brought to pass 
the Chinese Revolution of 1911, aiming to take hold of the 
reins of government and thus to establish a strong and stable 
government for her own protection. Now this Shantung 
question represents foreign aggression or encroachment on 
the territorial sovereignty of China, which she aims to up-
hold under the aegis of the Republic. Hence, in resisting 
Japan's aggression in Shantung, China is simply following 
the tradition of her historical development. To win in the 
Shantung question is to succeed in the assertion and main-
tenance of her territorial sovereignty. To fail is to acknowl-
edge servitude. Hence, the Shantung question will become 
the battle cry of Chinese nationalism, and hence the Chinese 
people, determined as they are to preserve their territory 
and sovereignty, will never yield in the Shantung affair. 
Again ,this question represents the conflict of Japan's poli-
cies in China and China's policy for herself. As we recall, 
Japan aims to exploit the natural resources of China, and to 
e~tablish her position of paramount influence. She also aims 
to control and dominate China-by strengthening her influ-
ence around and in Peking through her dominance in Man-
churia and Shantung. On the other hand, China strives for 
self-preservation-for her independence and sovereignty. She 
aims to preserve what she has, and in addition, to recover 
her lost or delegated rights of sovereignty. Hence the Shan-
tung question represents the conflict of the policiczs of the 
two nations. 
Further, the Shantung question involves the sanctity o£ 
international law, the maintenance of which constituted one of 
the objects of the World War. It raises the question as to 
whether the nations are to observe the principles of inter-
national law, or are to relapse into anarchy. If they mean 
to uphold the sanctity of international law, they must right 
the wrong done in the Shantung decision. Hence, the sue-
cessful and .right solution of the Shantung question means 
the vindication of the sanctity of international law. 
Finally, the Shantung question represents the moral issue 
of might versus right. By virtue of her military and naval 
forces, Japan has acquired the German rights in Shantung 
in evident violation of China's neutrality and sovereignty. 
On the other hand, because of the insufficient backing of 
force, China has failed to recover the rights which should 
have pr01Jerly belonged to her. If Japan wins eventually 
in the Shantung question, it means an unfortunate reaffirma-
tion of the principle of "Might makes right." On the other 
hand, if China wins, it is a successful vindication of the prin-
ciple of "Right makes might" 
As to remedies for the Shantung question, there are only 
three. First, Japan may change her policy and thus the 
Shantung question may be successfully solved. But this is 
scarcely ex pected, at least in the immediate future. She will 
stand by the agreement of September 24, 1918, and the Treaty 
of May 25, 1915, or still better, the original Twenty-one 
Demands. She will also stand by the Shantung decision as 
embodied in Articles 156, 157, 158, of the Treaty of Peace 
with Germany, which gives a legal sanction to her position 
in Shantung. It is therefore reasonable to expect that, in 
the absence of other adequate remedies, Japan will not likely 
yield in the Shantung question in any substantial way, unless 
and until she changes her policy toward China as a whole. 
The second remedy is the League of Nations, or Conference 
of Powers. Will the League or Conference reconsider the 
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question and right the wrong of the Shantung decision? 
That is the question which few will dare to answer. Be it 
as it may, it is within reason to believe, however, that the 
League or Washington Conference will have to take into con-
sideration the pride and honor of Japan, for the maintenance 
of which Japan will do all in her power to prevent a recon-
sideration of the question. It is also reasonable to expect 
that in case of a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
unless Great Britain is released from obligation, she will be 
obligated to support Japan in the Conference or in the Coun-
cii and the Assembly, which means that, in the case of the 
League, China can not get a unanimous report or recom-
mendation from the Council or a report or recommendation 
from the Assembly concurred in by all the members repre-
sented in the Council and a majority of the other members, 
exclusive in each case of the parties to the dispute, which is 
requisite to give the report or recommendation the sanction 
of the League, in case one party chooses to comply therewith. 
The third remedy is that China should become strong her-
self, and thus cause Japan to respect her rights. This seems 
to be the shortest as well as the noblest way, to a solution 
of the question. For Japan's action in Shantung is based on 
the inability of China to uphold her rights. As soon as 
Japan sees that China is able to do so, rather than run the 
gauntlet of a conflict with her, Japan will yield. Further, 
Japan's policies toward China, it will be remembered, are 
partly founded on China's weakness. The minute China be-
comes strong, the raisetl d'etre of some of Japan's policies 
will be eliminated, and she will surely change her attitude and 
policy, in consequence. Hence, in the absence of a voluntary 
change of policy on the part of Japan and adequate action 
by the League of Nations or the Washington Conference, the 
remedy will lie in the rise of a strong China. 
The basis of solution of the Shantung question is simple. 
Giving due recognition to Japan's service and sacrifice in 
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the capture of Kiaochow, and paying due regard to the 
sovereignty of China, the principle of the solution should be, 
on the one hand, that as a recompense for her service and 
sacrifice, Japan should be entitled to some form of compen-
sation; and, on the other, that, in full recognition of China's 
sovereignty, Japan should restore to China all German con-
cessions in Shantung, including the Kiaochow-Chinan Rail-
way, the adjoining mines, and the leased territory, subject, 
however, to the proviso that these concessions should not be 
mortgaged or alienated by China in any way to any other 
foreign power. Thus Japan would receive her due share of 
compensation and China would maintain her territorial sove-
reignty and recover her rights. 
After the foregoing was written, the Shantung Question 
entered upon a new stage of development, which deserves our 
attention. On September 7, 1921, the Japanese Government 
submitted to the Chinese Government nine proposals as the 
terms of settlement for the dispute.46 On October 5, 1921, the 
4li. Sen. Hearings, Sen. D~c. No. 106, op. cit., p. 561, the 
testimony of Mr. Ferguson. 
46. Copy furnished by the Chicago Daily News, dispatch by the 
Assoc!a ted Press. 
(1) The leasehold of K!ao Cha u and the rights originally 
g ranted to Germany with regard to the 1lfty k!lometre zone 
around the Kino Chau Bay shall be restored to China. (2) The Japanese government will abandon plans for the 
establishment of a Japanese exclusive settlement or of an oPen 
International settlement In Tsing Tao: Provided that China 
engages to open of Its own accord the entire leased terri-
tory or Kino Chou as a port of trade and to permit the 
nationals of all foreign countries freely to reside and to 
carry on commerce, industry, agriculture or any other lawful 
pursuits within such territory, and that she further under-
takes to respect the vested rights of all foreigners. China 
shall likewise carry out forthwith the opening ot suitable 
cities and towns within the province of Shantung tor resi-
dence and trade of the nationals ot all foreign countries. 
Itegulntlons for the opening of places under the foregoing 
clauses s'hall be determined by the Chinese Government upon 
consultation wlth the powers interested. (3) The Kiao Chou-Tslnantu railway and all mines appur-
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Chinese Government made the reply,4' in general rejecting 
the proposals. 
In the first proposal, the leasehold of Kiaochow and the 
rights originally granted to Germany with regard to the 
tenant thereto shall be worked as a joint Slno·Japanese en-
terprise. (4) Japan wlll renounce all preferential rights with re-
gard to foreign assistance in Persons, capital and material, 
stipulated In the Sino-German Treaty of M•arch 6, 1898. 
(5) 'Rights relating to the extensions of the Klao Chou-
Tslnanfu railway, as well as options for the construction of 
the Yentai-Welbsien railway w1ll be thrown open for the 
<'omm on activity of the lnternationnl fin ancial con sortium In 
Chinn. 
(6) The status of the custom house at Tslngtao as forming 
an Integral part of the general customs system of China shall 
be made clearer than under the German regime. (7) Public property used for administrative purposes within 
the leased terri tory of Klao Chou will, In general, be trans-
ferred to China; It bein&- understood that the maintenance 
and operation of public works and establishments shall be 
arranged between the Japanese and Chinese Governments. 
(8) With a view to arranging detailed plans for carrying 
Into eft'ect the terms of settlement above Indicated and for the 
purpose ot adjusting other matters not embodied therein, the 
Japanese and Chinese Governments shall appoint their repre-
sentative commissioners as soon as possible. 
(9) The Japanese Government have on more than one occa-
sion declared willingness to proceed to the recall of Japanese 
troops now stationed along the Kino Chou-Tslnanfu Railway 
upon organization by China of a police force to assume 
protection of the railway. As soon as the Chinese Govern-
ment shall have organized such a pollee force and notified 
the Japanese Government to that effect, Japanese troops 
will be ordered to hand over to the Chinese pollee the cbarge 
of the railway protection, and thereupon Immediately to 
withdraw. It Is, however, to be understood that the question 
of the organlza tlon of a special pollee guarding the Kino 
Cbou-Tslnanfu railway shall be reserved for future consid-
eration between Japan and China. 
47. Copy furnished by the Chinese J>egatlon, Washing ton, D. C. 
With reference to the Important Shantung Question which Is 
now pending he tween China and Japan. China bas Indeed 
been most desirous of an early settlement for the restitu-
tion of her sovereign rights 11nd territory. The reason why 
China bas not until now been able to commence negotiations 
with Japan Is because of the fact that the basis upon which 
Japan claims to negotiate are all of a nature either highly 
objectionable to the Chinese G{)vernment and the Chinese 
people, or such to which they have never given their recog-
nition. Furthermore, In regard to the Shantung Question, 
although Japan has made many vague declarations she has 
fifty kilometer zone were to be restored to China. This is 
simply a reiteration of the pledge of restoration made in the 
exchange of notes, May 25, 1915. In the eyes of the Chinese, 
this proposal carries no more weight than one to restore to 
China what by rights belongs to her. For China regards the 
leasehold of Kiaochow as having been abrogated by her dec-
laration of war against Germany on August 14, 1915, and 
as one which should have reverted to her possession on that 
date. Hence the reply : 
"The lease of Kiao Chou expired immediately on China's 
declaration of war against Germany. Now that Japan is 
only in military occupation of the leased territory the latter 
in fact had no plan which Is fundamentally accpetable. There· 
fore the case has been pending for many yeats much to t·he 
unexpectatlon of China. On September 7 Japan submitted 
certain proposals for the readjustment of the Shantung Ques-
tion In the form of a memorandum together with a verbal 
statement by the Japanese Minister to the effect that in view 
or the great principle of Sino-Japanese friendship Japan hae 
decided unon this fair and just plan as her final concession, 
etc. After careful consideration the Chinese Government feels 
that much In Japan's new proposals Is still Incompatible 
with the repeated declarations of the Chinese Government, 
with the hopes and expectations ot the entire Chinese P.eople, 
and with the principles laid down In treaties between China 
and tbe foreign powers. If these proposals are to be consid· 
ered the final concession on the part of Japan, they surely 
fall short to prove the sincerity of Japan's desire to settle 
the question. For instance: 
(1) The lease of Klaochow expired Immediately on China's 
declaration or war against Germany. Now that Japan Is 
only In mllltary occupation of the lensed territory the latter 
should be wholly returned to China without conditione. 
There can be no question of any leasehold. 
(2) As to the opening of Klaochow Bay as a commercial 
port for the convenience of trade and residence of the na-
tionals of all friendly powers, China has already on previous 
occasions communicated her intentions to do so to the pow-
ers, and there can be no necessity for the establls'hment of 
any purely foreign settlement ~gain. A!!!rlcultural pursuits 
concern the fundamental means of existence of the people 
of a country; and according to the usual practice of all 
countries, no foreigners are permitted to engage In them. 
The vestecl rights of foreigners obtained tl)rou~~:h lawful 
processes under fhe German Regime shall of course be re-
spected but thoEe obtained by force ~nd compulsion durin!!! 
the period of Japanese military occupation and against law 
ancl treaties can In no wise be recognized. And again al-
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should be wholly returned to China without conditions. 
There can be no question of any leasehold." 
The second proposal offered to surrender the claim to an 
exclusive Japanese settlement or an international concession 
in Tsing Tao as was stipulated in the exchange of notes, May 
25, 1915. This abandonment, however, was to be made on 
conditions that would safeguard the economic interests of 
the Japanese and other foreigners. First, China was to "open 
cf its own accord the entire leased territory of Kiaochow as 
a port of trade," which was also a reiteration of a stipula-
tion in the exchange of notes, May 25, 1915. Second, China 
was "to permit the nationals of all foreign countries freely to 
though this same article in advocating the opening of cities 
and towns of Shantung as commercial ports agrees with 
China's intention and desire of developing commerce, the 
opening of such places should nevertheless be left to China·s 
own judgment ami selection In accordance with circum-
stnnces. As to the regulations governing the opening of 
such plnces, Chinn will undoubtedly bear In mind the object 
of atrording tacilltles to international trade and formulate 
them according to established precedents of self-opened ports 
and sees, therefore, no necessity In this matter tor any pre· 
vlons negotia tiona. (3) The joint operation of the Shantung Railway, that Is, 
the Klaochow-Tslnnn Line, by China and .Japan is objected 
to by the entire Chinese people. It Is because in all coun-
tries there ought to he a unified system for railways, and joint operation destroys unity of railway management and 
impairs the rights of sovereignty; and, in view of the evils 
of the previous cases of joint operation and t'he impossi-
bility of correcting them, China can now no longer recog-
nize It as a mo tter of principle. The whole line of the 
Shantung railway, together with the right of control and 
management thereof should be completely handed over to 
China; and after a just valuation of Its capital and proper-
ties one half of the whole value of the line not returned shall 
be purchased back .by China within a fixed period. As to the 
mines appurtenant to the Shantung Railway which were al-
ready operated by the Germans, their plan of operation shall 
be fixed In accordance with the Chinese Mining Laws. (5) With reference to the construction of the extension 
of the Shantung Railway, that Is, the Tslnan-Shunteh and 
Klachow-Hsnchow Lines, China wiJI, as a matter of course, 
negotiate with International financial bodies. As t() the 
Chefoo-Welhsien Railway, it is entirely a dtrerent case, and 
cannot be discussed in the same category. (6) The Custom House at Tsintao was formerly situated 
reside and to carry on commerce, industry, agriculture or 
any othet; lawful pursuits within such territory," the pursuit 
of agriculture being specifiically mentioned which was gen-
erally considered as an occupation, open to the citizens or 
natives only. Third, China undertook "to respect the vested 
interests and rights of all foreigners, regardless of the 
validity of acquisition. Fourth, she would likewise "carry 
out forthwith the opening of suitable cities and towns within 
the province of Shantung for residence and trade of the 
nationals of all foreign countries," which was one of the stipu-
lations of the treaty of May 25, 1915. Fifth, regulations for 
the opening of places under the foregoing clauses should be 
In a leased territory, and the system of administration dif-
fered slightly from others. When the leased territory is 
restored, the Custom House thereat should be placed under 
the complete control and Dilanngement of the Chinese Gov-
ernment and should not be dlfterent from the other Custom 
Houses In its system of administration. 
(7) The extent of public properties Is too wide to be 
limited only to that portion used for administrative purposes. 
The meaning of the statement In the Japanese memorandum 
that such property will in principle be transferred to China, 
etc., rather lacks clearness. If It Is the sincere wish of 
Japan to return all the public properties to China, she ought 
to band over completely the various kinds of official, semi-
official, municipal and other public properties and entei' 
prises to China to be distributed, according to their nature 
and kind, to the administrations of the central and local 
authorities, to the municipal council and to the Chinese Cus-
toms, etc., as the case may be. Regarding this there Is no 
necessity for any special arrangement, and 
(9) The question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops 
from the Province of Shantung bears no connection with the 
restoration of the Kinocbow Leased Territory and the Chinese 
Government has repeatedly urged for Its actual execution. It 
Is only proper that the entire Japanese .A:rmy of Occupation 
should now be immediately evacuated. As to the policing of 
the Kiaochow-Tslnan Railway, China will Immediately send 
a suitable force of Chinese Railway Pollee to take over the 
duties. The foregoing statement gives only the main points 
which are unsatisfactory and concerning which the Chinese 
Government feels it •absolutely necessary to make a clear 
declaration. Furt'her, In view of the marked dillerence of 
opinion between the two countries, and apprehending that 
the case might long remain unsettled, China reserves to her-
selt the freedom of seeking a solution of the question when-
ever a suitable occasion presents Itself. 
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determined by the C:hinese Government with the Powers 
interested. 
In reply, China welcomed the surrender of the claim to an 
exclusive settlement or an international concession and also 
pointed out that inasmuch as China had on .previous occa-
sions declared her intention to open Kiaochow as a commer-
cial port for the convenience of trade and residence of the 
nationals of all friendly nations, there could be "no necessity 
for the establishment of any purely foreign settlement 
again." She objected particularly to the inclusion of agricul-
ture among the pursuits allowed to foreigners. 
"Agricultural pursuits concern the fundamental means 
of existence of the people of a country; and according to 
the usual practice of all countries, no foreigners are per-
mitted to engage in them." 
She declined to concede indiscriminate recognition to all 
vested interest and rights of foreigners, but pointed out the 
difference between those legitimately acquired under the Ger-
man regime and those illegally possessed during the Japanese 
military occupation. 
"The vested rights of foreigners obtained through lawful 
processes under the German regime shall of course be 
respected but those obtained by force and compulsion dur-
ing the period of Japanese military occupation and against 
law and treaties can in no wise be recognized." 
She also objected to the idea of being called upon to open 
cities and towns in Shantung as commercial ports and de-
dared that "the opening of such places should nevertheless 
l'e left to China's own judgment and selection in accordance 
with circumstances," plainly maintaining her own full sove-
reignty. She further declined to enter into previous nego-
tiations as to the regulations governing the opening of such 
places, thus again asserting the principle of sovereignty, al-
though conceding that China would "undoubtedly bear in 
mind the object of affording facilities to international trade 
and formulate them according to established precedents of 
self-opened ports." 
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In the third proposal, ' the joint enterprise was proposed of 
the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railroad, as stipulated in the Agree-
r'lent of September 24, 1918, respecting the control of the 
K:aochow Railway, and also of the mines appurtenant thereto. 
To this China strenuously objected on the ground not only 
of the illegal acquisition in consequence of the violation of 
China's neutrality and sovereignty, but also of the undesira-
bility of the foreign control of railways and the necessity of 
unification and nationalization of the same. 
"The joint operation of the Shantung railways, that is, 
the Kiao Chow-Tsinanfu Line, by China and Japan is ob-
jected to by the entire Chinese people. It is because in 
all countries there ought to be a unified system for rail-
ways, and the joint operation destroys unity of railway 
management and impairs the rights of sovereignty; and, 
in view of the evils of the previous cases of joint operation 
and the impossibility of correcting them, China can now 
no longer recognize it as a matter of principle. The whole 
line of the Shantung railway, together with the right of 
control and management thereof should be completely 
handed over to China: and after a just valuation of its 
capital and properties one-half of the whole value of the 
line not returned shall be purchased back by China within 
a fixed period. As to the mines appurtenant to the Shan-
tung railway which were already operated by the Germans, 
their plan of operation shall be fixed in accordance with 
the Chinese Mining Laws." 
The fourth proposal offered to renunciate the preferential 
rights with regard to foreign assistance in persons, capital and 
material, as stipulated in the Sino-German Treaty of March 
6, 1898. This would eliminate the wall of preferential claims 
and thus open Shantung to the enterprise of all foreigners, 
indicating the desire of the Japanese to maintain equality of 
commercial opportunities. To this favorable proposal China 
was not opposed, and hence she made no reply thereto. Upon 
a closer examination, however, this apparent renunciation is 
tantamount to a surrender of something which Japan has not 
acquired. Maintaining as we do that the Kiaochow Lease 
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Convention of March 6, 1898, which embodied the prefer-
ential clause, was abrogated by China's declaration of war 
against Germany, it is but plain that the German rights of 
preference were nullified upon the declaration of hostility. 
While Japan might claim that the treaty of peace with Ger-
many, June 28, 1919, awarded her the German rights in 
Shantung, it is to be maintained that China did not sign that 
treaty and thus refused to recognize the validity of the 
award~ While voluntary renunciation on the part of Japan 
might be commendable, her proposal did not harmonize with 
the fundamental conviction and principle of the Chinese. 
In the fifth proposal, the extensions of the Kiaochow-
Tsinanfu Railway, as provided in the agreement of May 24, 
1918 (respecting the construction of the Tsinan-Shunteh and 
Kaomi-Shuchow Railways) and the options for the construc-
tion of the Chefoo Weihsien Railway as stipulated in the 
Treaty of May 25, 1915, respecting Shantung, were to be 
thrown open for the common activity of the international 
financial consortium. Inasmuch as the exchange of letters 
between Thomas W. Lamont and N. Kajiwara on May 11, 
1920, and the Japanese entrance into the New International 
Banking Consortium placed these railway concessions within 
the scope of the New Consortium, this proposal was deemed 
as a mere statement of a situation already in existence. The 
reply was therefore made: 
"With reference to the construction of the extension c f 
the Shantung Railway, that is, the Tsinan-Shunteh ar.d 
Kiao Chou-Hsuchou Lines, China will, as a matter of 
course, negotiate with international financial bodies." 
But as the Chefoo-W eihsien Railway concession was ex-
acted under duress by the treaty of May 25, 1915, which 
should be either abrogated or revised, the suggestion there-
about was deemed to be "entirely a different case'' and could 
not "be discussed in the same category." 
The sixth proposal tendered to make the status of the cus-
toms house at Tsingtao as forming an integral part, of the 
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general customs system of China clearer than under the 
German regime. Inasmuch as the full control of the cus-
toms house at Tsingta6 was considered as a natural con-
sequence of the restoration of Kiaochow Leased Territory, 
China contended that the status of the Tsingtao customs 
house should be the same as that of any other Chinese cus-
toms house. 
"When the leased territory is restored, the custom house 
thereat should be placed under the complete control and 
management of the Chinese Government and should not bf' 
different from the other custom houses in its system of 
administration." 
In the seventh proposal, public property used for adminis-
trative purposes within the leased territory of Kiaochow was 
tendered to be transferred to China, but as to the maintenance 
and operation of public works and establishments, special ar-
rangement was to be made between the Japanese and Chinese 
governments. This . proposal volunteered the tran!Jer of pub-
lic property used for administrative purposes, but still in-
si~ted on previous negotiation or special arrangement for the 
d1sposal of public works and establishments, which consti-
tuted one of the four conditions attached to the Japanese 
pledges of restoration of Kiao Chou as embodied in the ex-
change of notes, May 25, 1915. Inasmuch as all public 
properties, either for administrative purposes or otherwi~e, 
should be returned with the restoration of the leased terri-
tory without special arrangements, the proposal was there-
fore rejected : 
"The extent of public properties is too wide to be limited 
only to that portion used for administrative purposes. If 
it is the sincere wish of Japan to return all the public prop-
erties to China, she ought to hand over completely the 
various kinds of official, semi-official, municipal and other 
public properties and enterprises to China to be distributed 
according to their nature and kind, to the administrations 
of the central and local authorities. to the tnunicipal coun-
cil and to the Chinese customs, etc., as the case may be. 
Regarding this th(·rr is no necessity for any special 
arrangement." 
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The eighth item proposed the ap[>ointment oi representa-
tive commissioners by the Chinese and Japanese governments 
to arrange detailed plans "for carrying into effect the terms 
of settlement above indicated and for the purpose of adjust-
ing other matters not embodied therein." To this suggestion 
China made no reply. 
The ninth and last term of settlement tendered the with-
drawal of Japanese troops along the Kiao Chou-Tsinan fu 
Railway upon the organization by China of a police force to 
take over the protection of the line. This offer was, however, 
accompanied by the reservation that the question of the 
organization of a special police guarding the railway should 
be reserved for future consideration between Japan and 
China. This exception signified that Japan still held on to 
the claim of establishing a police force trained and controlled 
by the Japanese, as stipulated in Article 4 of the Agreement 
of September 24, 1918, respecting control of the Kiao 
Chou-Tsinanfu Railway. As this proposal was tantamount 
to the original claim of a police force trained and controlled 
by the Japanese and as the agreement in question of Sep-
tember 24, 1918, was considered invalid or voidable, and since 
the presence of Japanese troops infringes upon her sovereignty, 
China could not but decline the offer. 
"The question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops of 
Shantung province bears no connection with the restoration 
of the Kiao Chou Leased Territory and the Chinese Gov-
ernment has urged repeatedly for its actual execution. It 
is only proper that the entire Japanese Army of Occupation 
should now be immediately evacuated. As to the policing 
of the Kiao Chou-Tsinan Railway, China will immediately 
send a suitable force of Chinese railway police to take over 
the duties." 
From the above terms of settlement as offered by Japan, 
it can be seen that what Japan tendered to surrender was not 
hers by right, but rather what she should have given up. 
Inasmuch as the Kiao Chou Leased Convention of March 6, 
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1898, is regarded as abrogated with the declaration of war, 
the Kiao Chou Leasehold and the German preferential rights 
have therewith been nullified. As the exchange of letters 
between Thomas W. Lamont and N. Kajiwara on May 11, 
1920, placed the extensions of the Shantung Railway within 
the scope of the New International Banking Consortium, the 
railways in question should have become open to the common 
activities of the New Consortium. The only term of settle-
ment that might be commended and regarded with favor is 
the offer to surrender the claim to an exclusive Japanese 
settlement or an international concession, but this is offset 
by a requirement to recognize all vested interests and rights 
acquired during the Japanese military occupation, legitimate 
or illegitimate. 
On the other hand it is also plain that Japan did not pro-
pose to surrender any vital interests, or to meet any funda-
mental objection of the Chinese. She still insisted on the 
joint enterprise of the Kiao Chou-Tsinanfu Railway, future 
negotiation regarding the organization of the railway police, 
special arrangement for the disposal of public works and 
establshments, clearer definition of the status of the customs 
house at Tsing Tao, and the recognition of vested interests 
acquired by foreigners legitimately or otherwise. In short, 
Japan still aims to achieve economic domination in Shantung. 
She made no confession of her mistake or crime in landing 
her troops at Lungkow and then marching through the Chi-
nese territory and seizing the Kiao Chou-Tsiananfu Railway 
and the adjoining mines, and thus failed to recognize and 
respect the fundamental principle of the sovereignty of China. 
She still ignored the basic contention of the Chinese that 
China's declaration of war abrogated all the treaties, conven-
tions and agreements with Germany, inclusive of the Kiao Chou 
Leasehold and that China thus recovered to herself all the 
former German concessions. She further failed to concede 
that her possession of German rights in Shantung was vali-
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dated, neither by the treaty of May 25, 1915, which was 
concluded under duress, nor by the Agreement of September 
24, 1918, respecting control of the Kiao-Chou-Tsinanfu 
Railway, which was entered upon for illegal consideration, 
nor by the Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919, to 
which China was not a contracting party. 
The Chinese government therefore prefaced the reply with 
a· declaration of disappointment over the terms of settlement 
and failure of Japan to meet the fundamental contentions 
and objections of the Chinese: 
"With reference to the important Shantung Question 
which is now pending between China and Japan, China has 
indeed been most desirous of any early settlement for the 
restitution of her sovereign rights and territory. The 
reason why China has not until now been able to commence 
negotiations with Japan is because of the fact that the 
basis upon which Japan claims to negotiate are all of a 
nature either highly objectionable to the Chinese Gov-
ernment and the Chinese people, or such to which- they 
have never given their recognition. Furthermore, in regard 
to the Shantung Question, although Japan has made many 
vague declarations she has in fact had no plan which is 
fundamentally acceptable. Therefore the case has been 
pending for many years much to the unexpectation of China. 
On September 7 Japan submitted certain proposals for the 
readjustment of the Shantung Question in the form of a 
memorandum together with a verbal statement by the 
Japanese Minister to the effect that inview of the great 
principle of Sino-Japanese friendship Japan has decided 
upon this fair and just plan as her final concession, etc. 
After careful consideration the Chinese Government feels 
that much in Japan's new proposals is still incompatible 
with the repeated declarations of the Chinese Government, 
with the hopes and expectations of the entire Chinese peo-
ple, and with the principles laid down in treaties between 
China and the foreign powers. If these proposals are to be 
considered the final concession on the part of Japan, they 
surely fall short to prove the sincerity of Japan's desire to 
settle the question." 
Consequent to the rejection of the terms of settlement, and 
anxious to reach a solution of the Shantung Question at an 
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early date, the Chinese Government made the reservation 
at the conclusion of the reply "of seeking a solution of the 
question whenever a suitable occasion presents itself," appar-
ently giving the hint that, with concurrence of the powers 
interested, the Shantung Question might be made a subject 
for discussion in the Washington Conference on Limitation 
of Armament and Far Eastern Problems. 
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